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The Relative Impact of the Gulf War on Human Capital 
Development in Iraq 
ROBERT E. LOONEY 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 93943, USA 
INTRODUCTION 
It is often argued1 that the expansion in 
military expenditures in the Persian Gulf States 
over the last several decades has led to com-
petition between the military and nonmilitary 
sectors for skilled labor. Furthermore, military 
expenditures are said to have preempted funds 
that might otherwise have been allocated to 
education and the improvement ot" human 
capital. As a result, military expenditures in 
the region tended to frustrate development 
plans even in the more affluent oil exporting 
countries. • 
Certainly if this thesis is correct, Iraq, 
particularly following the outbreak of the Gulf 
War, should be suffering a major decline in its 
human capital development. Up to the begin-
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ning of the war, Iraq had made significant 
strides in improving its educational system, 
with special emphasis given to advanced and 
vocational training. The literacy rate had 
shown marked improvement by 1980 to 43.4%, 
although there remained a pronounced differ-
ence between male literacy at 62.9% and 
female literacy at 23.3%. School attendance 
has been hampered in the years since 1980 by 
the war and by shortages of staff, especially at 
the secondary level. 
Since 1980, however, the Iraqi economy has 
been adversely affected by three separate 
factors. The war itself has caused damage to 
plant and involved recurrent costs and disrup-
tion. Investment policy, influenced by political 
considerations, permitted high levels of de-
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velopment expenditure at least during the early 
war years. This combined with the stepped 
level of military expenditures, particularly in 
the latter war years, to create a rapid expan-
sion in the country's foreign debt. Finally, the 
international oil glut from 1981 onwards 
seriously reduced revenues. 2 
Clearly, the ability of Iraq to reconstruct its 
economy in the years to come will depend to a 
large part on the country's stock of human 
capital. The purpose of this Professional Note 
is to present some preliminary findings on the 
impact of the Gulf War. Our focus was on the 
country's investment in education. Has human 
capital in Iraq deteriorated during the war 
years and, if so, in what sense? How has 
human capital development compared with 
that in Iran? What are the implications for the 
country's postwar reconstruction? 
FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
The main quantifiable variables pertained to 
allocations to defense, government expendi-
tures and the public education that may gener-
ate human capital. The latter is proxied by the 
ratio of public education expenditure as a 
proportion of gross domestic product (GDP). 
Following Deger, 3 we assume that public edu-
cation spending as a proportion of the national 
product is a crucial determinant of human 
capital formation. If this ratio falls, the rate of 
growth of human capital may, in all prob-
ability, fall too. 
As Lebovic and Ashfaq have noted,4 one of 
the main difficulties with previous studies was 
their lack of clarity as to whether the military 
burden acted in some way as a statistical proxy 
for government expenditures. To avoid this 
problem, total government expenditures ~ere 
included in the analysis in addition to military 
expenditures, with each defined in terms of 
a different ratio. Specifically, government 
expenditures were treated in terms of their 
share of GNP. 
To avoid spurious correlations with govern-
ment expenditures, allocations to defense were 
defined in ways other than the traditional 
military burden (military expenditures share of 
GNP). Since the literature is unclear as to the 
most appropriate definition of the defense 
burden, three alternative measures were used: 
(a) military expenditures per soldier, (P) the 
defense share of the central government 
budget, and (c) the military participation 
rate-the number of soldiers per 1000 popu-
lation. 
Increases in hull).an capital formation over 
any period are likely to be affected by the 
initial level of human capital formation. 
Specifically, countries with relatively low levels 
of human capital development are more likely 
to experience pressures to increase their alloca-
tions to education. This process is similar to the 
capital stock adjustment mechanism whereby 
investment is likely to be higher the greater the 
difference between the actual and optimal 
stock of capital assets. 5 To control for this 
factor, the rate of human capital development 
at the beginning of the period (i.e. 1974 for the 
1974-1984 interval) was introduced into the 
regression equation. 
Finally, rapid increases in per capita income 
may reduce the ratio of educational expendi-
tures to GDP particularly in the oil exporting 
countries where, due to absorptive capacity 
problems, oil revenues often outrun the 
government's capability to expand productive 
expenditures. 6 To achieve unbiased estimates 
this factor should also be controlled for the 
share of the government budget at higher 
levels of per capita income. To control for this 
factor, the increase in per capita income with 
the expected negative sign was also introduced 
into the regression equations. 
RESULTS 
Our findings indicate that the process of 
human capital development in the Third World 
appears to be affected to a certain extent by 
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the pattern of military expenditures simul-
taneously undertaken by these states. The 
patterns vary considerably by subgrouping-
Arab vs non-Arab--and by period-the late 
1970s vs the early 1980s. In general, these· 
patterns have become more extreme with time. 
A major finding was that Arab countries 
have tended (particularly in the more recent 
times) to experience positive associations be-
tween military expenditures per soldier (and to 
a certain extent increased military participation 
rates) and human capital development. On the 
other hand, increased military expenditures 
per soldier (and to a lesser extent the military 
participation rate) appear to have come at the 
expense of human capital development in the 
non-Arab world. 
During the earlier period, Iraq appears to 
have followed pretty closely the patterns ex-
perienced by most Third World countries, and 
certainly those of the Arab world. This situ-
ation deteriorated somewhat in the second 
period, however, with Iraq missing many of the 
apparent linkages between expanded military 
expenditures per soldier and allocations to 
education which existed in many other Arab 
states. On the other hand, there is some 
evidence that increased military participation 
during the 1979/1984 period stimulated in-
creased rates of human capital development in 
Iraq. 
As a basis of comparison, Iran appears to 
have done relatively well with regard to its 
human capital development, particularly dur-
ing the earlier period. 
CONCLUSIONS 
While it might seem intuitively obvious that 
shifting public allocations toward military ex-
penditures would retard human capi•al de-
velopment and hence decrease a country's 
long-run growth prospects (and presumably 
increase its dependence on foreign workers), 
the results presented above indicate that this 
view is too simplistic. Admittedly, this possi-
bility may hold some validity for many de-
veloping countries, but it does not appear to be 
an accurate description of the process by which 
resources are allocated in the Arab world. 
Certainly, in recent years, increases in military 
expenditure per soldier (and perhaps also the 
military participation rate) appear to com-
plement the normal allocations to education 
provided by most states. 
Based on the results presented above, one 
can only speculate as to the mechanisms 
linking military expenditures and human capi-
tal formation in the Arab world. Given short-
ages of skilled labor in Iraq,7 the government 
may have assigned a very high priority to 
attracting available skilled labor to the military 
services.8 
More likely, the Iraqi government has opted 
to subsidize education for increased numbers 
of civilians during periods of stepped up 
military expenditures with the understanding 
that upon completion of training those indi-
viduals will serve some time in the military. 
This strategy would allow the military to 
absorb the large volume of sophisticated 
weapons flowing into the country without 
requiring drastic increases in the number of 
foreign military advisers. 
This interpretation is consistent with the 
results obtained above. Given the fairly high 
correlation between military expenditures and 
government revenues in the region,9 allo-
cations to both defense and education could 
increase fairly rapidly without either category 
experiencing significant changes in its share of 
the budget. Because of the low skill levels of 
the local population, it is unlikely that rapid 
increases in military expenditures per soldier 
and in the number of soldiers per capita could 
be absorbed without accelerated training pro-
grams both within and outside the military. 
The results presented here suggest that 
additional estimates should be undertaken, in 
particular the impact on economic activity of 
other types of government expenditures-
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especially those going to administration and 
services. It may well turn out that these 
expenditures have even higher opportunity 
costs in terms of labor shortages and/or 
reduced levels of educational attainment. · 
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